Russian information operations have shifted substantially from the 2016-era IRA troll farms into a more diffuse threat. One subset of Russian IO actors demonstrate how heavily intertwined Russian state interests and Yevgeny Prigozhin’s sprawling business interests have become and the interesting ways they leverage info ops. In this talk we’ll discuss the following case studies and actions Google and YouTube took to disrupt these IO campaigns:
IO amplifying Prigozhin-backed feature-length films promoting Russian state interests
IO in Africa leveraging unwitting journalists (EBLA, Sudan) or active where Wagner Group has contracts (Central African Republic)
Campaigns on Blogger and Hashtap focused on promoting Russian interests in Ukraine
Russian language IO aimed at supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine, smearing Alexei Navalny, or other politicians Prigozhin quarrels with
The case studies highlight several trends we’ve seen more broadly looking at how Russian IO has evolved over the last few years beyond just the Prigozhin-linked campaigns:
Russian IO actors obscure their role through stronger operational security and use a range of cut-outs to conduct the actual user facing activity.
Most of these campaigns achieved little reach
IO actors moving towards more permissive online spaces and platforms (Telegram, Parler, Gab)